

Zürich 1953

15 Contenders for the World Chess Championship

by

Miguel Najdorf

Introduction by Yuri Averbakh

Foreword by Andy Soltis



2012

Russell Enterprises, Inc.
Milford, CT USA

Zürich 1953
15 Contenders for the World Chess Championship
by Miguel Najdorf

ISBN: 978-1-936490-43-1

© Copyright 2012

Russell Enterprises, Inc.
Hanon W. Russell

All Rights Reserved

No part of this book may be used, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any manner or form whatsoever or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written permission from the publisher except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.

Published by:
Russell Enterprises, Inc.
P.O. Box 3131
Milford, CT 06460 USA

<http://www.russell-enterprises.com>
info@russell-enterprises.com

Cover design by Janel Lowrance
Translated from the Spanish by Taylor Kingston
Introduction by Yuri Averbakh translated from the Russian
by Inga Gurevich

Printed in the United States of America



Table of Contents

Introduction	5
Foreword	7
Translator's Preface	10
From the Publisher	11
Author's Foreword	12
Preface	14
The Players	18
Crosstables	42
Round 1	44
Round 2	55
Round 3	63
Round 4	73
Round 5	83
Round 6	95
Round 7	107
Round 8	116
Round 9	124
Round 10	137
Round 11	148
Round 12	161
Round 13	171
Round 14	182
Round 15	191
Round 16	204
Round 17	219
Round 18	231
Round 19	243
Round 20	255
Round 21	267
Round 22	277

Zürich 1953

Round 23	292
Round 24	303
Round 25	313
Round 26	324
Round 27	334
Round 28	344
Round 29	353
Round 30	361
The Tournament in Review	369
Theoretical Survey	374
Opening Index by Name	388
Opening Index by ECO Code	389
Player Index	391
Computer-Assisted Supplement (free PDF download): http://russell-enterprises.com/ excerptsanddownloads.html	

Introduction

This book focuses on one of the most important chess competitions of the twentieth century, the candidates tournament for the world championship, held in Switzerland in the fall of 1953. In the spirit of a marathon, the tournament lasted about two months and consisted of 30 rounds. It was attended by the 15 strongest grandmasters in the world; one of them, Max Euwe, was a former world champion, and two others, Vassily Smyslov and Tigran Petrosian, were future champions. Four candidates, Max Euwe, David Bronstein, Gideon Ståhlberg, and Miguel Najdorf, wrote books about this significant event.

Miguel Najdorf (1910-1997), the author of this book, belonged to the world chess elite for about 30 years and hardly needs any introduction. He was born in Warsaw, Poland, to a poor Jewish family. He was then called Moishe, and when he grew up, Mieczyslaw. He became interested in chess relatively late by modern standards, but by the mid-30s of the last century, he was among the strongest chessplayers in the country. In 1939, he made the Polish team and went to Argentina for the world chess Olympiad in September of that year. Soon afterward, the Second World War broke out. Poland was quickly occupied by German and Soviet armies, and Najdorf, like many other players, decided to stay in South America. In 1944, he became a citizen of Argentina.

I met Najdorf in 1950 during the candidates tournament for the world championship in Budapest. I remember our first conversation very well. He asked about my parents and I told him that my father was Jewish and my mother was Russian. He exclaimed, “That makes you a Jew, according to Hitler!” Back then it was a sore point for him. When he arrived in Europe, he discovered that many of his relatives and friends had perished in Nazi concentration camps.

Being in South America during the war serendipitously saved Najdorf’s life. Curiously, Najdorf did not become a chess professional. In Buenos Aires, he opened an insurance company, made a fortune, and became independently wealthy. He was convivial and witty, and got to know people easily. I can say that, despite our age difference, we established a warm friendship. By the way, Miguel could be regarded as a polyglot. He had equally good command of Polish, Russian, Spanish, and English.

I remember, once we visited a casino together. He bought a few chips, placed them on a bunch of numbers, and – can you imagine! – he won. After that, he scattered the chips on the same numbers and won again. Once more, he scattered the chips on the same numbers. “Miguel, what are you doing?!” I could not help exclaiming, “Your luck cannot last forever!” “You’re right,” he said, “but I wanted to see how long it could last!”

Back to the book. As you will see, quite a few spectacular, interesting, and informative games were played at this tournament, but, as it often happens, the tournament was not without curiosities. Two of them involved the American champion Samuel Reshevsky. In the game with Geller, in a winning position, he ran into a stalemate, and, in the game with Szabó, he could have been checkmated in

Zürich 1953

two moves, but his opponent did not notice it. I would like to mention that there were many more good, instructive games at this event, however, as you will see for yourself.

The main feature of the tournament is that there were no inferior players; everyone was well prepared and determined to win; everyone was dangerous. Smyslov's success was well deserved. In 1954, the following year, he proved that the level of his play was not inferior to the world champion's. Speaking of whom, Botvinnik, after drawing his match with Bronstein, even earlier, in 1951, admitted that he was not the only *primus inter pares*, which in Latin means "first among equals!"

Among the participants who played well, I should mention the youngest, Tigran Petrosian. He took a respectable fifth place, behind only Smyslov, Reshevsky, Bronstein, and Keres, foretelling a good future; he would become world champion ten years later.

A little about myself. I must admit, I was hoping for more, but played at my level: winning mini-matches against Euwe, Keres, and Najdorf, and losing to Reshevsky, Kotov, and Gligoric and, more importantly, losing both games to the last place finisher Ståhlberg. Apparently the Swede was a difficult opponent for me. Out of the five games that I played against him, I only managed a single draw!

Overall, however, I always remember this tournament with great pleasure; it proved to be the most important competition of my life. Of the participants of this tournament, which took place almost 60 years ago, only three survive: Taimanov, Gligoric, and I.

Yuri Averbakh
Moscow
January 2012

Foreword

What makes a great tournament book – the notes or the games?

Neuhausen-Zürich 1953 had more than twice as many great games as any other candidates tournament or match cycle. It is almost impossible to write a poor book about it. Both Miguel Najdorf and David Bronstein tried to capture the brilliance and depth of the 210 games and their vastly different works rival one another for the title of best tournament book ever.

In today's era, when super-GMs qualify for the world championship cycle on the basis of rating, "privileges" and a variety of other criteria, it's worth noting how the 1953 entrants were chosen:

Five players were seeded based on their results in the previous candidates tournament, Budapest 1950. (Only one or two players would be seeded in succeeding candidates.) The FIDE rules also stipulated that only five players would qualify from the Saltsjöbaden 1952 Interzonal.

But that created a problem. After the stunning Soviet successes at Saltsjöbaden, it turned out that nine of the seeded or qualifying ten players would be coming from Moscow or Leningrad. Neuhausen-Zürich was looking less like a world championship event than a second "Absolute Championship of the U.S.S.R."

FIDE took two controversial steps. First, it offered "personal" invitations to Max Euwe (who had declined his invitation in 1950) and Samuel Reshevsky (who was barred by the U.S. State Department from going to Budapest because of Cold War tensions).

Second, FIDE increased the number of interzonal qualifiers to eight. This meant adding three non-Soviets – Svetozar Gligoric, Laszlo Szabo and Gideon Ståhlberg. They had tied with Yuri Averbakh for fifth place at Saltsjöbaden but had worse tiebreaking points than he did.

As a result, Neuhausen-Zürich was by far the biggest, in terms of players and games, of any candidates tournament, and lasted an exhausting eight weeks. (The double-round 1950 version was over in six weeks, par for the course.)

After the first half was over, Vassily Smyslov led with 9½ points. Only Reshevsky seemed to be able to catch him. Rounds 22 to 25 – when Smyslov had three wins and a bye while Reshevsky scored 1½-2½ – proved decisive. But there was more to the story. In 2001 David Bronstein gave a detailed account in the Russian magazine *64* of how members of the Soviet delegation tried to stage-manage the finish to ensure that Smyslov and not Reshevsky would qualify to become the world championship challenger to Mikhail Botvinnik. Smyslov wrote a response calling Bronstein's revelations "scandalous." But he didn't deny them.

Now as to the books, Najdorf versus Bronstein:

Fans who assume that grandmasters agree on the key moments of a game will be stunned when they compare the two texts. What one annotator considers crucial, the other sees as trivial. In game 38, for example, Bronstein wrote that he could not have passed up the surprising exchange sacrifice 24.♖×e6. Najdorf

made no comment. Three moves later Najdorf criticized 27...a6 as a poor way to defend. Bronstein ignored that move, indicating the game was over.

Bronstein – or rather Bronstein and his un-credited co-author, spymaster Boris Veinstein – annotated in a style that was often brief and cryptic compared with Najdorf. The Argentine’s notes are frequently twice as detailed, such as in games 117, 120 and the blunder-filled 130. Bronstein is kind when it comes to mistakes. Najdorf, on the other hand, more than once called a blunder “incredible” and he awarded question marks to three straight Bronstein moves in game 61.

Most readers who are familiar with Bronstein’s book will have seen a translation of the second Russian edition, which appeared well after Najdorf’s book. In it, Bronstein indirectly acknowledged how much he disagreed with the Argentine. For example, in game 32, Najdorf found 19.♖xg6 inexplicable. Bronstein replied, “This exchange is explained by Euwe’s intention to give mate by opening the h-file.”

Bronstein’s reluctance to use punctuation marks often leaves you wondering where the games were won or lost. Not so with Najdorf. In game 21 you know what he thinks of “15.d×e6!” and “19.♗f3!” or in game 48 about “19...♗f5?” His use of punctuation makes the outcome of several games, including games 85, 93, 103 and 104 much easier to understand than in Bronstein’s work.

This is not just a matter of taste. The instructional nature of the work is affected. Najdorf’s awarding of a question mark to 13...c4 in game 112 helps explain why it’s a classic example of prematurely closing the center. Bronstein’s comment on the move (“He should stick to waiting tactics and act in accordance with his opponent’s intentions.”) is hardly helpful.

Enough carping. You can enjoy this book just by marveling at the games. Here you’ll find, for example, Alexander Kotov’s greatest victory, game 96, featuring the ...♙×h3+! move that adorns his tombstone. Curiously Najdorf does not point out the faster win, 33...♗g4!, that mars the combination. But Najdorf has a lot to say about game 58, Euwe’s “immortal,” the sack-fest against Najdorf himself. The loser is full of praise, self-criticism and variations, while Bronstein, in general terms, emphasizes the intuitive nature of the sacrifice.

Bronstein included his wins over Reshevsky, game 91, and Szabo, game 136, in one of his best-game anthologies and then added the draw with Euwe, game 39, in another. In collections of Paul Keres’ best games you’ll find his wins over Ståhlberg, game 33, Tigran Petrosian, game 108, and Geller, game 155. The most commonly anthologized Petrosian victories from the tournament are his King’s Indian Attack wins over Ståhlberg, game 177, and Euwe, game 69. This wasn’t a good tournament for Gligoric but his win over Euwe, game 150, is a splendid example of how to win ♖+4♙s-vs.-♖+3♙s. Averbakh’s textbook demonstration of the power of protected passed pawns is game 71. And Geller’s best-game collection included his victory over Euwe, game 114, and his positional crush of Najdorf, game 88 — which at the time seemed to raise doubts about whether the Najdorf Sicilian had been refuted by 6.♗e2!

Some of the very best games are draws: Geller’s miraculous save, two pawns down in a rook endgame against Reshevsky, game 167; the definitive “Petrosian

Foreword

exchange sacrifice,” game 12, and the spectacular thrust-and-parry of Keres-Reshevsky, game 77, to name a few. What other tournament offers amazing examples like that?

And some of the games feature remarkable blunders. Szabó could have resigned after five moves as White (!) against Keres, game 18. In his memoirs he revealed how he overlooked a mate in two against Reshevsky, in game 130, because the American moved so quickly. After he counter-blundered, “I just sat there, shook my head, unable to make a single move for a whole hour,” he wrote.

There is a sharp difference between the two books in how they treat some of the tournament’s famous incidents. Najdorf had a notoriously bad relationship with Reshevsky and you might detect it in game 17 and elsewhere. Yet he neglects to mention the drama of game 51 when, according to Bronstein, Reshevsky was stunned by Kotov’s 34...♖e2. He “grabbed his head, glanced anxiously at his flag, which was about to drop” and then spotted 35.♖f8+ in time, Bronstein wrote. Reshevsky’s version, in his *How Chess Games Are Won*, was that he wasn’t surprised at all by 34...♖e2. “A superficial glance at the position might lead one to believe White is in trouble,” he wrote. “But I had a surprise for Kotov.”

Or compare what the two books have to say about the verbal exchange in game 73. Najdorf said he asked Isaac Boleslavsky if he was playing for a draw. When he said no, Najdorf asked if he was playing for a win and got another no. In the end, Boleslavsky said he was just playing on because he liked his position. In Bronstein’s version Boleslavsky was talking solely about the move 8.♖d8, and his final comment was “I made the move that meets the requirements of the position.” Despite Boleslavsky’s celebrated lack of humor, Najdorf’s account sounds more plausible.

What can we make of all this? Here’s a revisionist perspective:

In the half-century since Bronstein’s work was published, it was hailed as the perfect tournament book. It is, of course, a classic. But it might be just the *second*-best book written about this tournament.

Andy Soltis
New York
February 2012

(52) *Bronstein – Boleslavsky*

Nimzo-Indian Defense [E22]

**1.d4 ♖f6 2.c4 e6 3.♗c3 ♘b4
4.♙b3 c5**

Another very good continuation is 4...♗c6 5.♗f3 d5 6.e3 (if 6.a3 dxc4 7.♙xc4 ♙d5!! 8.♙xb4 ♗xb4 9.♗xd5 ♗c2+! 10.♙d1 ♗xa1 11.♗xc7+ ♙e7 12.♗xa8 ♘d7 with a strong attack) 6...0-0 7.a3 dxc4! 8.♘xc4 ♘d6 9.♘b5 e5 10.♘xc6 exd4 11.exd4 bxc6 12.0-0 ♘g4 13.♗e5 c5 14.♘g5 ♗e6 15.d5 with an even game (analysis by Pachman).


5.dxc5 ♗a6 6.♗f3

If 6.a3 ♘xc5 7.♗f3 b6 8.♘g5 ♘b7 9.e3=, Eliskases-Botvinnik, Moscow 1936.

**6...0-0 7.♘g5 ♘xc5 8.e3 b6
9.♘e2 ♘b7 10.0-0 ♗e7 11.♙fd1
♗c5 12.♙c2 ♗fe4**

With this move Black equalizes completely.

**13.♘xe7 ♙xe7 14.♗xe4
♗xe4 15.♗d4 d5 16.cxd5 ♘xd5
17.f3 ♙fc8 18.♙a4 ♗c5 19.♙a3
♘b7 20.♘f1 h6 21.b4 ½-½ (D)**



After 21...♗d7 22.♙b2 a6, or 22.♗b5 a5 23.♗d6 ♙c7, there is no way to force matters.

(53) *Gligoric – Ståhlberg*

French Defense [C15]

**1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.♗c3 ♘b4
4.♘d3**


A variation less common than 4.e5, 4.a3, 4.♘d2, or 4.♗e2. The text move

seems aimed at rapid development, however, in our opinion, it has the drawback that Black, by successive threats, can force White to lose several tempi, which is contrary to the principles of sound development in the opening.

4...dxe4

Best. If 4...c5 5.exd5 ♙xd5 6.♘d2 ♘xc3 (not 6...♙xg2 7.♗e4, or 6...♙xd4 7.♗f3) 7.♘xc3 cxd4 8.♘xd4 ♙xg2 9.♙f3 ♙xf3 10.♗xf3 with good piece play for the sacrificed pawn.

5.♘xe4 c5 (D)



Too routine. Since White has a space advantage, we consider it inexpedient to open up the position so quickly. We would prefer 5...♗f6 6.♘f3 (if 6.♘g5 h6) 6...♗bd7 7.♗ge2 0-0 8.0-0 (if 8.♘g5 ♗e7, or if 8.♗f4 ♘d6) 8...e5 with good play.

**6.♗ge2 ♗f6 7.♘f3 cxd4
8.♙xd4 ♙xd4 9.♗xd4 a6**

The exchange of queens has favored White because of his evident space advantage, while his ♘f3 makes normal development of Black's queenside considerably more difficult. No good was 9...♘xc3+, which though it would double White's pawns, leaves Black's own dark squares without protection.

10.0-0 ♗bd7

The same maneuver as recommended at move five. Done then, it would have allowed Black to oppose the strong ♘f3 with c7-c6.


11.♞e1

Preventing 11...♗e5.

11...0-0 12.♗d2 ♞d8

Better was 12...♗d6 immediately, intending the liberating ...♗e5, allowing development of his queen's bishop.

13.a3 ♗d6 14.♞ad1 ♗c7? (D)



Clearly, this is not usual for grandmaster Ståhlberg, who does not seem to be in top form. Ståhlberg by temperament is not a passive player; on the contrary, his typical mode is counter-attack! For this reason it is surprising that he does not play 14...♗e5, and if 15.♗f4 (15.♗g5 ♗xf3+ 16.♗xf3 b5) 15...♗c4! (not 15...♗xf3+ 16.♗xf3 ♗e7 17.♗a4 ♗d5 18.♞xd5 ♞xd5 19.♗b6 ♞f5 20.♗g3 winning.) 16.♗xd6 ♞xd6 with a defensible position; if 17.b3 ♗xa3 18.♗db5 (18.♗f5 ♞xd1 19.♞xd1 ♗d7) 18...♗xb5 19.♗xb5 ♞xd1 20.♞xd1 ♗f8! 21.♗d6 ♗e7.


15.♗g5 h6 16.♗h4 g5 17.♗g3 ♗xg3 18.hxg3 g4 19.♗e2 ♗b6 20.♗b3 ♗d7 21.♗a5

Black has weaknesses on both flanks. Gligoric, who up to now has played impeccably, continues to press without pause.

21...♞ab8 22.♞d6 ♗c8 23.♞d4!

Forcing a new weakness.

23...e5 24.♞d2 ♞e8 25.♗e4 (D)



The decisive moment has arrived!

25...♗xh3 26.♞xd7 ♗c5 27.♞c7 ♗e6 28.♞xb7 ♗d6 29.♞d7 ♞b6 30.b4 ♗b5 31.♗c4 ♞c6 32.♗xh3 ♞xc2 33.♗xh3 axb5 34.♗xf7 ♗f8 35.♗xh6


The weak points fall one by one.

35...♞e7 36.♞d5 ♗c7 37.♞f5+ ♗e8 38.♞xe7+ ♗xe7 39.♗xg4 ♞a2 40.♞c5 ♗d6 41.♞c3 1-0

(54) *Taimanov – Euwe*

Nimzo-Indian Defense [E59]

1.d4 ♗f6 2.c4 e6 3.♗c3 ♗b4 4.e3 c5 5.♗d3 d5 6.♗f3 0-0 7.0-0 ♗c6 8.a3 ♗xc3 9.bxc3 dxc4 10.♗xc4 ♗c7 11.♗a2 (D)




What a difficult game chess is! How many inexhaustible possibilities are contained within it! In a tournament as important as this, it is obligatory to plan serious openings, and make moves prepared by long analysis. In any given line of play the ideas keep coming indefinitely, according to the style and taste of each master, and that is why

we are always finding novelties and innovations.

As we have already seen in earlier games, in this position 11.♖e1 (Averbakh), 11.♗d3 (Bronstein), 11.♖c2 (Geller), and 11.a4 (Najdorf) have been played. Taimanov's idea, like that of Bronstein, is to remove the undefended bishop from the potentially opened file, but without losing its dominance of the a2-g8 diagonal. In our opinion, the text move's major drawback is that the bishop is far removed from the kingside, an absence that will be felt later on.

11...e5 12.♖c2 (D)



Since White is considering playing d4-d5 we must calculate the possibility of doing it immediately: 12.d5 e4 13.dxc6 ♗g4 (if 13...exf3 14.♖xf3 ♗g4 15.♖g3 ♖xc6 16.c4 with the better game) 14.h3 ♗h5 15.g4 ♖xg4 16.♖d7!! If instead of 12...e4 Black plays 12...♖d8, then 13.e4.

12...♗g4 13.d5

Game 140, Geller-Kotov, arrived at this same position, where White played 13.♖xe5.


13...♖e7 14.c4 ♗xf3

Euwe, it appears, does not fear to leave the bishop pair in his rival's hands, as they are still out of action, while Black's knights invade more quickly the opened position on the kingside.

15.gxf3 ♖d7 16.♗b1 ♖g6


Better than 16...♖h3 17.♗b2 ♖g6 18.♖f5.

17.♖f5 ♖xf5 18.♗xf5 ♖h4 19.♗e4? (D)



Taimanov enters the ending clearly inferior, perhaps lost. It was preferable not to exchange the bishop, and to give up the pawn as follows: 19.♗d3 ♖xf3+ 20.♖h1 e4 21.♗e2.

19...♖xe4 20.fxe4 f5 (D)



21.exf5

Much more resistance was offered by, for example, 21.f3 fxe4 22.fxe4 ♖f3 23.♖xf3 ♖xf3+ 24.♖g2 ♖g5 25.♗b2 ♖e8 26.♖d1 ♖xe4 27.d6 ♖f6 28.♗xe5 ♖xe5 29.d7 ♖xd7 30.♖xd7 ♖xe3 31.♖xb7 ♖xa3 32.♖b5.

21...e4! 22.f4

White cannot permit ...♖f3+.

22...exf3 23.e4 ♖ae8 24.♗g5 ♖xe4 25.♗xh4 ♖xh4 26.♖xf3 ♖xc4 27.♖e1

If 27.♖d1 ♖d8.

27...♖g4+28.♖f2 ♖d4 29.♖e7 ♖xd5 30.f6 ♖xf6 31.♖xf6 gxf6 32.♖xb7 a5 33.♖b5 a4 34.♖a5 ♖d4 35.♖xc5 ♖d3 36.♖a5 ♖xa3 37.♖a7 ♖a1 38.♖g3 a3 39.♖g4 a2 40.♖h5 f5 41.♖h6 f4 0-1

(55) *Najdorf – Szabó*

Grünfeld Defense [D71]


**1.d4 ♖f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5
4.cxd5 ♗xd5 5.g3**

5.e4, although more usual, has recently been the subject of many studies, with which I was not up-to-date. The game Simagin-Ilivitsky, USSR ch 1952 continued 5.e4 ♗xc3 6.bxc3 c5 7.♗c4 ♗g7 8.♗e2 0-0 9.0-0 cxd4 10.cxd4 ♗c6 11.♗e3 ♗g4 12.f3 ♗a5 13.♗d3 ♗e6 14.d5 ♗xa1 15.♗xa1 f6 16.♗e1 ♗f7 17.♗d4 ♗c8 18.♗e2 a6 19.f4 b5 with good play for Black.

**5...♗g7 6.♗g2 ♗xc3 7.bxc3
c5 8.e3 0-0 9.♗e2 ♗c6 10.0-0
♗a5 11.♗b3**

The best continuation I had at this moment was 11.a4 ♗d8 12.♗b1 ♗c7 13.♗a3 b6 14.♗f4 ♗a6 15.♗e1 ♗c4 16.♗f3 ♗ac8 17.♗ed1, as in Taimanov-Ilivitsky, USSR ch 1952.

11...♗g4! (D)



12.♗f4

At this moment I realized that by not playing 11.a4 I had lost my opening advantage. On the contrary, Black has developed his pieces rapidly, and despite my pawn center being strong, he can always find some way to break it up.

It was apparent that Szabó already knew this variation, by virtue of its having been played several times in the last Soviet championship. For example, the game Ilivitsky-Kopylov continued

with 12.f3 ♗e6 13.♗a3 (not 13.d5 c4) 13...♗c4 14.♗xa5 ♗xa5 15.♗e1 ♗ac8 16.♗a3 b6 17.f4 ♗fd8 and Black stands better.

In the game I could not continue 12.♗xb7 because of 12...♗xe2 13.♗e1 ♗xc3.

12...e5 13.dxe5 ♗xe5 14.h3

Without despairing, and assessing the situation exactly, I try to equalize the game.

**14...♗f3 15.♗xf3 ♗xf3+
16.♗g2 ♗e5 17.e4!**

This opportune advance allows me to develop the queen's bishop and at the same time secure a support point for posting the knight on d5.

**17...b5 18.♗e3 c4 19.♗c2
♗d3**

Szabó wants to use the power of his ♗g7 and obtain a queenside pawn majority, which will be an advantage in the endgame. At the same time, he tries to eliminate my knight, which could become strong on the advanced outpost d5.

**20.♗xd3 cxd3 21.♗xd3 ♗xc3
22.♗ad1 ♗ac8 23.♗d5!**

A very good move, which defends the queen's flank and threatens – after ♗b3 – to enter with the rook onto the seventh rank.

23...♗fe8 24.♗b3 ♗c4

If 24...a6 25.♗d7 ♗c4 26.f3 f5 27.♗h6 fxe4 28.fxe4 with good play for White.

25.♗d5

Undoubtedly 25.♗d7 was more aggressive.


**25...a6 26.♗xc4 bxc4 27.♗xa5
♗xa5 28.♗f3 ½-½**

After 28...c3 29.♗c1 ♗b8 30.♗d4 ♗b2 31.♗xc3 ♗xc3 32.♗xc3 ♗xa2 there is complete equality.

(56) *Petrosian – Averbakh*

Queen's Gambit Accepted [D37]

1.c4 ♘f6 2.♗c3 e6 3.♗f3 d5
4.e3 ♕e7 5.d4 0-0 6.♕d3 (D)



Since White has chosen this line of play he should enter into the famous Rubinstein formation with 6.b3. This has been the preferred weapon of Rubinstein and of Najdorf over many long years. The idea is to maintain the center, and later by ♗c1-b2 dominate the e5-square, and if next 7.♕d3 dxc4, then recapture with the pawn.

6...dxc4!

With this exchange Black enters a

line of the Queen's Gambit Accepted with an extra tempo. The reason is that usually the king's bishop recaptures from its initial square, while here having moved to d3 it must do so in two moves. So with the opening barely started it can be said that Black has no problems, since with an extra tempo "both sides are white."

7.♕xc4 c5 8.0-0 a6 9.dxc5

Petrosian immediately understands that he has lost a tempo, and wishing to avoid a full-on fight with that handicap he forces exchanges with a view to a draw. In our opinion, once committed such an error is not a cause for discouragement if it can eventually be remedied, even though here a draw is being sought prematurely.

9...♖xd1 10.♗xd1 ♕xc5 11.a3 b5 12.♕e2 ♗b7 13.b4 ♕e7 ½-½

The possibility of a fight still exists, but two masters of equivalent strength may logically reach this result.

Round 9

57. Szabó	0	Petrosian	1
58. Euwe	1	Najdorf	0
59. Ståhlberg	0	Taimanov	1
60. Boleslavsky	½	Gligoric	½
61. Kotov	½	Bronstein	½
62. Geller	½	Reshevsky	½
63. Smyslov	1	Keres	0

Bye: Averbakh

Standings after round 9: Reshevsky 6½; Smyslov 6; Euwe 5½; Keres 5; Boleslavsky, Bronstein, Gligoric and Najdorf 4½; Taimanov 4; Averbakh, Petrosian, and Szabó 3½; Geller, 3; Ståhlberg 2½; Kotov 2.

The fifteen grandmaster candidates for the world chess championship are now in Zürich. The tournament will be contested in the Salon of Music of the House of Parliament, where spectators will gather around the fifteen to witness the games.

The public's interest is enormous, and while the number of spectators is limited by the size of the room, whoever has seen the crowds of people surrounding the